far as Austria was concerned, and with it went the war spirit. That is why a determined attack on an imperfectly trained army raised from such unpromising material and crowded with "unreliables," had a better chance of success than an offensive against perfectly organised defensive positions, held by the most efficient army in the field—in training, equipment and leadership—and with a morale which, if not unabated, was equal to the best in any other army on any battlefield.

It is said that up to that date the Italian Army had made no extensive progress in its repeated assaults on the Austrian Army. The Italians had in fact advanced much further than we had at Loos or on the Somme, or the French at Artois, Champagne, and the Somme on much more favourable ground. They had lost fewer men, they had made greater progress, they had spent far less ammunition than either the French or British Armies, nevertheless the result was no more decisive than in the French and British offensives. But there was this vital difference, which was an element in any wise consideration of the possibilities of the terrain of the next offensive—the Italian artillery was inferior in every particular to that of their Austrian opponents, especially in heavy guns; and the supply of ammunition was insufficient,

Extent of Italian

even for
Artillery ^ suc^ &uns as ^ey had, to keep up the
offensive to the point of decision. Not only was the artillery too light to level trenches hewn
into the rocky plateau of the Carso, but it was often
not equal to the task of destroying barbed wire
defences. There were many critical occasions where
" garden pincers " had to be used to make up for
deficiencies in artillery preparation. Not even the